Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions

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Scenario. A group needs to settle multiple independent decisions (or issues), either at the same time or over time. We want to have fair outcomes, i.e., we want to satisfy all voters (to some extent) across the issues.

Example. A committee organizing a party. When? Budget? Theme?



Untruthfully opposing an alternative (winning by a large margin) in some Free-Riding. issue in order to receive greater consideration in other issues. For instance: Unanimous location (the Nice Pub), but no consensus on the date. If (only) you oppose the Nice Pub, it still wins. Being "dissatisfied" with the location, out of fairness, you get more weight when deciding the date. You got the location you liked, but you decided the date:

you are a free-rider.

We investigate when is free-riding possible, its computational complexity, and experimentally asses its risk for voters (i.e., the likelihood of it leading to a worse outcome).

We focus on approval ballots, and on two families of voting rules (Thiele and ordered weighted averaging rules). Both consider the satisfaction of voters to make fair decisions.

Free-riding is possible with all rules except issue-wise majority. In some cases (e.g., issues are decided at the same time by the leximin rule) it never leads to a worse outcome.

Good news.

Bad news.

For many rules, when issues are decided one after the other, free-riding can lead to a worse outcome.

Simulations indicate that the risk of free-riding is high: in some

settings, up to 20% of the time it leads to a worse outcome. Deciding if free-riding is possible or beneficial is often NP-hard.

Free-riding is unavoidable in fair multi-issue decision making. However, it is risky for many voting rules, and its consequences are hard to predict. Thus, it is less appealing as it might seem at first.

